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Abstract 
 
 
Organisations can gain competitive advantage by taking risks within their market. An organisation may 
promote a particular approach to business opportunities within its employees.  
 
Increasingly organisations within a “knowledge-based economy” trade in information assets. A simple 
example may be an employee travelling to a potential client’s premises to present details of their 
organisation’s work. Here the asset is the work being presented, which has value to the presenting 
party. A possible benefit is that the presented work influences the potential client to enter into a 
business partnership.  
 
There are also risks in the previous example that may equally result in losses for the presenting party. 
The details of the presented work may be lost or stolen in transit, or retained by the potential client 
against the wishes of the presenting party. It may even be that the individual(s) presenting the work 
have malicious intentions of their own which are then satisfied once they have the organisation’s 
information assets in their possession.  
 
An organisation will seek to permit some activities – and forbid others – as part of its risk approach. 
Senior management will often have a sense of what should and should not be done with the 
organisation’s information assets. These commands may then be communicated to the information 
security manager e.g. the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), or whoever is responsible for 
managing the security of the organisation’s information assets. The information security manager (or 
their staff) must then translate the risk approach into security controls within the organisation’s 
information security infrastructure. 
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1. Introduction 
Organisations can gain competitive advantage by taking risks 
within their market. An organisation may promote a particular
approach to business opportunities within its employees.
Increasingly organisations within a “knowledge-based economy”
trade in information assets. A simple example may be an
employee travelling to a potential client’s premises to present
details of their organisation’s work. Here the asset is the work 
being presented, which has value to the presenting party. A 
possible benefit is that the presented work influences the potential 
client to enter into a business partnership. 
There are also risks in the previous example that may equally
result in losses for the presenting party. The details of the 
presented work may be lost or stolen in transit, or retained by the
potential client against the wishes of the presenting party. It may
even be that the individual(s) presenting the work have malicious
intentions of their own which are then satisfied once they have the 
organisation’s information assets in their possession.
An organisation will seek to permit some activities – and forbid
others – as part of its risk approach. Senior management will often 
have a sense of what should and should not be done with the
organisation’s information assets. These commands may then be 
communicated to the information security manager e.g. the Chief 
Information Security Officer (CISO), or whoever is responsible 
for managing the security of the organisation’s information assets. 
The information security manager (or their staff) must then 
translate the risk approach into security controls within the 
organisation’s information security infrastructure. 
Permitted and prohibited actions are most readily communicated
across an organisation through policies. These may be defined in
natural language. Different parts of the information security
software/hardware infrastructure may however be governed by
machine-readable security policies or configurations. 
There is a need to provide tool support for security policy
managers to allow them to configure machine-readable
information security policies, and at once be provided with a 
quantifiable measure of the risks and benefits that arise from 
specific policy properties. Although such tools already exist (e.g. 
[11]), risks are often driven by employees, and so provision of a 
perspective on human behaviour in the workplace would also be 
beneficial. This would then allow for fine-tuned, quantifiable 
assessment of the risks that employee behaviour presents to an 
organisation’s information assets within the context of the 
information security infrastructure and its configuration. As far as 
we are aware no such tool support currently exists.
Here we provide a software tool that analyses access-control
policies, and provides quantifiable feedback of potential 
behaviour-oriented benefits and risks that policy properties create 
for an organisation and its information assets. The intention is to 
demonstrate that changes to an organisation’s software-level 
information security policies can be directly reflected in a
behaviour-oriented risk assessment model. This then provides the
capacity to consider human behaviour within an established and 
widely-understood information security process. 
We focus specifically on the use of removable USB storage
devices (e.g. USB memory sticks) by employees and how access
permissions for these devices can be expressed in the eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [5] access-control
language. Using this example we illustrate how a specialised, 
executable risk model can be used to provide a risk assessment of 
the permitted and prohibited employee activities defined within a
machine-readable access-control policy.
2. Implementation 
To achieve our goal we chose a software-based USB risk model 
and an information security policy definition tool, and created 
logic to bring these two elements together. This logic analyses
policies to identify those employee activities that may influence
the security of information assets stored on a removable USB
storage device. These qualities are then encoded as configuration
properties for the USB risk model. 
Figure 1: overview of policy risk modelling system
An overview of the system that was produced is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The components of the system are as follows: 
 XACML Editor:  allows creation and validation of 
XACML access control policies. 
 XACML Policy: the machine-readable access-control 
policy created by the XACML Editor. This may be used 
by the information security infrastructure to manage 
machine access to information assets. 
 Policy Parser: examines the XACML Policy for a pre-
configured set of access control characteristics, to be 
used as parameters in the risk modelling process. 
 Experiment File: the parameters identified by the Policy 
Parser are written to a configuration file, which is then 
used to calibrate the modelling process. 
 Demos2K eXperiments Manager (DXM): The Demos2K 
eXperiments Manager (DXM) [6] is a tool for managing 
instances of Demos2K [7] models (in this case a USB 
risk model). The DXM takes its configuration from the 
Experiment File. 
 USB Risk Model: the USB Risk Model [2, 3] is a 
Demos2K model that models USB device usage by 
organisation employees. The model properties are based 
in part upon elements of the XACML Policy examined 
by the Policy Parser. 
 DXM Caller: manages Experiment Files and instances 
of the DXM and USB Risk Model. The DXM Caller 
takes the output parameters of the USB Risk Model 
from the DXM and returns them to the XACML Editor. 
2.1 USB Risk Model 
There may be benefits to allowing employees to use removable 
storage devices but there are also inherent risks. Ideally 
organisations will have the capability to assess these benefits and 
risks, and use the results to inform their risk management 
strategy. 
The USB Risk Model [2, 3] models the actions that an employee 
or those in close proximity to the employee may enact upon a 
USB storage device projected over a pre-configured time period. 
The registered owner of a device is modelled as moving between 
a fixed set of location types: their workstation; their home 
(perhaps as part of a ‘teleworking’ program); a conference; a 
client’s premises, or; in transit between any of these locations. 
The device owner can perform any of a set of actions upon the 
device during the duration of the model, these being: write data; 
read data; delete data, or; wipe device contents.
The behaviour of individuals other than the device owner is also 
modeled. The USB Risk Model considers that work colleagues or 
malicious parties internal or external to the organisation (referred 
to as ‘traitor’ and ‘foe’ respectively) may also gain access to the 
device and its contents (either accidentally or deliberately). 
In this work the actions of an employee are assumed to be 
dictated by a company policy. There is also an assumption here 
that the permitted and prohibited actions in any policy that is 
analysed apply to everyone in the organisation, and are enforced 
at all times. 
Here we consider how to make the USB Risk Model directly 
applicable and accessible within a real organisational setting. 
Here we exploit the fact that the model can be configured to 
represent qualities of an organisation’s risk strategy. The model 
has an execution time that makes it responsive enough for 
environments where policy changes must be promptly 
communicated to various stakeholders. 
By feeding qualities of an organisation’s access control policies 
into the USB Risk Model, we are able to calculate the projected 
risks and benefits of organisation-specific USB access control 
policies and provide direct feedback as to their suitability.  
2.2 XACML 
XACML is an access control policy specification language that is 
widely used to define access control schemes for resources 
distributed across a managed network. In this work we use 
XACML policies to specify access control rules for local access 
to removable media devices (as also seen in e.g., Nextlabs 
Enterprise DLP [1]). 
By associating specific properties of an XACML policy with an 
instance of the USB Risk Model, we show that changes in an 
organisation’s security configuration can be analysed to produce a 
measure of the inherent risks and benefits that result from these 
changes.
2.3 XACML Editor 
The University of Murcia (UMU) created the UMU XACML 
Editor [4] to provide support for the creation and validation of 
XACML access control policy files. 
We altered the XACML Editor to include a ‘Modelling’ menu to 
allow execution of the USB Risk Model for whichever policy is 
open within the editor. 
2.4 Policy Parser 
The Policy Parser uses the Enterprise Java XACML API [8] to 
create Java objects that represent the various components of an 
XACML policy (e.g. Rules, Obligations, etc.). Logic within the 
Policy Parser examines these components for specific properties 
that relate to the configuration of the USB Risk Model. Note that 
no specialised elements or annotations need to be added to an 
XACML policy to enable this process. 
The XACML properties that are examined are described as 
follows:
 Action Permissions: the actions modeled in the USB 
Risk Model are assumed to be explicitly represented 
within two distinct Targets in an XACML Policy – the 
set of actions that the policy will ‘Permit’, and the set of 
actions that it will ‘Deny’. 
 Duration of Usage: the USB Risk Model is configured 
to model the projected risks and benefits of USB device 
usage over a specified length of time (1 year by 
default). Furthermore, the amount of time within a 
working day when an individual can use their USB 
device can also be configured, based upon the time 
restrictions stipulated in an XACML Policy for 
‘Permitted’ activities. 
 Encryption Policy: an organisation’s encryption policy
for USB devices can also be modelled. An XACML 
Policy is examined for an Obligation identifier which 
indicates whether USB device encryption is mandated. 
Once the Policy Parser has examined an XACML Policy, it 
constructs parameter-name/value pairs which are then sent to an
instance of the DXM Caller, which manages configuration and 
execution of the USB Risk Model. 
A number of assumptions are made to simplify use of the Policy
Parser and configuration of the USB Risk Model: 
 The USB Risk Model assumes that each individual uses
only one USB storage device. However for simplicity
we also assume that only one device drive will ever be 
used to connect a USB device to a computer, and that 
for all computers used by an individual the drive has the 
same, generic label; 
 The XACML policy refers to the access permissions of 
'everybody', since the USB Risk Model models device 
usage for a single, unclassified individual; 
 If encryption is stated as an Obligation, that this refers
to all data that is written to or read from a USB device; 
 If encryption is required that it cannot be circumvented, 
and that it applies in all modeled locations. 
2.5 DXM Caller 
The DXM Caller creates the experiment file that the DXM uses to 
manage a USB Risk Model instance. The DXM Caller populates 
the experiment file with the configuration properties obtained by
the Policy Parser. 
With the DXM configuration file built, the DXM Caller creates an 
instance of the DXM. The DXM then runs the USB Risk Model
and produces output files documenting intermediate and final 
values of state variables as obtained from the model. 
The DXM Caller examines these output files for the final values 
of selected risk measurement metrics (note that this is only a
subset of the results produced by the USB Risk Model). These
results are then extracted and associated with meaningful
identifiers (for readability), and presented within the modified
XACML Editor.
Figure 2: output of the policy risk modelling process 
As shown in Figure 2, the following parameters are retrieved from 
each instance of the USB Risk Model:
 Successful Work-Related Data Transfers: each
permitted transfer of data (e.g. a file) from the USB 
device is seen as benefiting the organisation; 
 Accidental Data Reveals: the number of occasions
when the contents of the storage device are accidentally
revealed to or left open to access by co-workers.
Whether co-workers have malicious intentions or not, 
they are nonetheless not meant to see the contents of 
another individual’s USB device; 
 USB Replacements: number of occasions when the USB
storage device has to be replaced (at a cost), based upon 
modelled employee behaviour; 
 Data Exposures: an estimate of the number of times
that a malicious party either within or outside the 
organisation will have an opportunity to read the 
contents of a USB storage device over the simulated 
lifetime of the model;
 Mean Time Between Exposures: the average time
between data exposures, measured in hours;
 Lost Passwords: the number of times when an 
individual forgets the password used to authenticate 
access to encrypted device contents. ‘Losing’ the 
password in this way will result in the individual having 
no access to files stored on the device.
The metrics modelled within the USB Risk Model were derived 
through consultation with a senior information security officer in 
an industrial organisation. With this it is perceived that a security
officer using the modified XACML Editor will be able to analyse
the results of the USB Risk Model and relate them to measures of 
risk that they are familiar with. It is assumed that the user is able 
to compare the results to a pre-defined, quantified risk 
management strategy, or otherwise use the results as evidence for 
information security management decisions. 
3. Discussion 
With this work we have demonstrated that an information security 
policy infrastructure can be augmented to provide real-time 
behaviour-oriented risk-modelling feedback. This does however 
raise a number of points, as shall be discussed here. 
Firstly, there is an assumption that the security officer responsible 
for managing a machine-readable security policy understands the 
organisation’s risk approach. The security officer is expected to 
be able to translate between natural-language policy directives 
and machine-read security policy content [9]. This task is 
however time-consuming and error-prone [10]. 
It is also assumed that the member of staff responsible for 
maintaining machine-read policies can act autonomously to 
change policies and in turn contribute to the organisation’s risk 
approach.
With the previous assumptions, our tool essentially requires users 
to have technical-level skills relating to security management and 
to be able to interpret the organisation’s risk approach. This is 
perhaps more likely to hold in smaller organisations than in larger 
enterprises. In the former, individual employees are typically 
required to ‘blend’ roles and develop cross-disciplinary abilities. 
In the latter individuals may specialise and may have to work 
within more rigorous and formalised procedures, where for 
instance technical-level IT officers are not expected to contribute 
to policy decisions. However, smaller and smaller organisations 
are less likely to deploy deeply-entrenched, organisation-wide and 
automated (i.e. policy-driven) security controls. 
To make the tool more widely applicable it may be necessary to 
repackage its capabilities. This could involve abstracting 
technical-level properties to make it applicable to managers (as 
discussed in e.g. [9]), or feeding in pre-prepared, machine-
readable risk properties so that a technical-level security officer 
can simply modify the policy until the tool deems the results 
satisfactory, without the officer necessarily having to interpret 
them. 
4. Conclusion 
It would be useful to allow information security managers (and 
other security policy managers within an organisation) to consider 
how employee behaviour affects the security of information 
assets. We have provided a supporting software tool that analyses 
access-control policies and produces metrics representing the 
benefits and risks of these policies concerning use of USB devices 
by individuals in an organisation.  
Our tool demonstrates that changes to an organisation’s software-
level security policies can be represented in a behaviour-oriented 
risk assessment model positioned within an established 
information security process. 
There is potential for the concept of extracting configuration 
properties from existing information security mechanisms and 
applying them to behaviour-oriented risk models to be applied to 
scenarios beyond USB device usage. 
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